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Minister of Mineral Resources v Mawetse (SA) 
Mining Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2016 (1) SA 306 
(SCA) 
Prospecting rights under the MPRDA: Public Law Instruments?* 1
Will the wind ever remember
the names it has blown in the past?
Jimi Hendrix
1 Introduction
Upon enactment of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development
Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) the State became the custodian of the mineral
resources of South Africa ‘for the benefit of all South Africans’ (s 3(1)),
and the Minister of Mineral Resources became empowered to grant new
types of rights to minerals, such as prospecting and mining rights to any
applicant (s 3(2)(a)).
Applications for prospecting rights or mining rights have to be lodged
at the office of the regional manager (ss 16(1) & 22(1) respectively). An
applicant for such rights has to comply with the general requirements of
the MPRDA (ss 17(1) & 23(1)(a)-(g) respectively; see further Badenhorst
& Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa (2004) 15-7 to 15-8
& 16-6 to 16-7). The MPRDA has also, as its object, the transformation of
the mining industry to attempt to counter the inequalities and exclusion
of black people from the mining industry in the past (see s 2(d); Minister
of Mineral Resources v Mawetse (SA) Mining Corporation (Pty) Ltd (2016 (1)
SA 306 (SCA) par 16). In addition to the general requirements, the
minister ‘may’, in terms of section 17(4) of the MPRDA, request the
applicant for a prospecting right to give effect to the object of section 2(d)
of the MPRDA. Compliance with transformation objectives, stated in
sections 2(d) and (f), is expressly required for the grant of a mining right
(s 23(1)(h)). Section 17(4) has, therefore, been perceived as discretionary,
whilst section 23(1)(h) has been seen as obligatory (Dale, Bekker &
Bashall et al South African Mineral Law (2005) 238). Section 2(d), a black
economic empowerment (BEE) provision, has, as its object, the
expansion of opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons to
enter the mineral industry and to benefit from mineral exploitation by
virtue of empowerment deals, whilst section 2(f) is aimed at the
promotion of employment and advancement of the social welfare of all
South Africans. Unlike mining, prospecting is not an attractive
investment destination for empowerment purposes because of its high
1 I wish to acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Professor
JC Sonnekus to an earlier draft. I, however, remain responsible for the
correctness of the end product.
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costs, risks and relatively poor success rate (Dale, Bekker & Bashall et al
supra at 240). So far, black economic empowerment deals undertaken by
the mining sector have generated R101 billion in total value attributable
to historically disadvantaged beneficiaries (Theobald, Tambo,
Makuwerere & Anthony ‘The Value of BEE deals’ 2015 Intellidex Research
Report available from https://www.google.com.au/?gws_rd=ssl#q=
Theobald%2C+Tambo+%26+Makuwerere+%E2%80%98The+Valu
e+of+BEE+deals%E2%80%99+2015+Intellidex+Research+Repor
t+ (accessed 2016-07-12). BEE compliance in respect of shareholding,
however, remains the biggest concern for foreign companies wanting to
invest in the South African mining industry (see Nkabinde ‘BEE turns off
US firms’ (2015-07-07) Citizen available from http://citizen.co.za/418054/
bee-turns-off-us-firms/ (accessed 2016-07-12).
On acceptance of an application and receipt of any additional
information requested, the regional manager forwards the application to
the minister for consideration (s 16(5)). The power to grant a prospecting
right has been delegated to the Deputy Director General of Mineral
Development (DDG; s 103(1)(2); item 5 of the Delegation of Powers by
the Minister of Minerals and Energy of 2004-05-12). In practice, the DDG
approves and signs the recommendation of the regional manager to
grant a prospecting right and grants a power of attorney to the regional
manager to sign the prospecting right upon notarial execution of the
agreement.
As to the legal nature of prospecting rights or mining rights, it is stated
that such rights granted in terms of the MPRDA are ‘limited real right[s]’
(s 5(1)). A grantee of such a right is obliged to lodge the right for
registration in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office
(MPTRO; ss 19(2)(a) & 25(2)(a) of the MPRDA respectively; s 5(1)(d) of the
Mining Titles Registration Act 16 of 1967 (MTRA)). For purposes of
registration, the ‘contract’ has to be notarially executed (s 15(2) of the
MTRA). A prospecting right or mining right that has been registered in the
MPTRO constitutes a ‘limited real right binding on third parties’ (s 2(4) of
the MTRA). The contradiction of the creation of a real right at the
occurrence of different legal acts – namely, upon grant by the minister
or delegate and registration in the MPTRO – and the doctrinal difficulties
caused by the poor draftsmanship of the legislature, has been raised and
discussed before (see Badenhorst ‘Nature of New Order Rights to
Minerals: a Rubikian exercise since passing the Mayday Rubicon with a
Cubic Zirconium’ 2005 Obiter 505). The contradiction caused by section
5(1) of the MPRDA was rectified by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources
Development Amendment Act 49 of 2008 (MPRDAA) which commenced
on 7 June 2013 (GN R14 GG 36512 of 2013-05-31). Section 5(1) of the
MPRDA now makes it clear that in the case of a prospecting right or
mining right, a real right is acquired upon grant and registration thereof.
Generally, a real right is created upon registration in the Deeds Office (s
16 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937) or the MPTRO (s 2(4) of the
MTRA). Upon execution, a prospecting right or mining right comes into
effect (ss 17(5) & 23(5) respectively, read with the definition of ‘effective
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date’). Nothing is stated in the MPRDA about the moment of creation or
legal nature of such rights before registration in the MPTRO. Such
granted rights were construed in the private law contexts as being
personal rights or contractual rights (Badenhorst 2005 Obiter supra at
505).
In a decision by the full bench in Meepo v Kotze (2008 1 SA 104 (NC)),
it was decided that the granting of a prospecting right to an applicant is
contractual in nature (Meepo v Kotze supra at par 46.3) and it takes place
when its terms and conditions have been determined and consensually
agreed upon or consented to by an applicant upon notarial execution of
the deed (par 46.3). The Court rejected the argument that a prospecting
right is granted when the DDG approved and signed the
recommendation of the regional manager to grant a prospecting right to
an applicant (parr 46.1 & 46.3; see further Badenhorst & Mostert
‘Dueling Prospecting rights: A Non-Custodial Second? Meepo v Kotze’
2008 TSAR 819; see also Doe Run Exploration SA (Pty) Ltd v Minister of
Minerals and Energy unreported, NCD case no 499/07 2008-02-08 parr
19-21).
In Global Pact Trading 207 (Pty) Ltd v the Minister of Minerals and
Energy; the Regional Manager: Mineral Regulation, Free State Region; the
Deputy Director-General: Mineral Regulation (unreported, OPD case no
3118/06 20017-06-14 par 2), it was decided that the decision of the
minister or delegate to grant or refuse an application for a prospecting
right, constitutes an administrative action, as defined in the Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, which administrative act has to
be procedurally fair (see Badenhorst & Carnelly ‘Review of a Refusal to
Grant a Prospecting right – Global Pact Trading 207 (Pty) Ltd v Minister of
Minerals and Energy’ 2008 Obiter 113). 
Therefore, the views differ as to whether a prospecting right that has
been granted by the DDG is contractual in nature or merely an
administrative act. The nature of a prospecting right and the bureaucratic
procedure for its application – grant, execution and coming into effect –
came under the scrutiny of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of
Mineral Resources v Mawetse (SA) Mining Corporation (Pty) Ltd ((20069/
14) [2015] ZASCA 82 (2015-05-28)). The abovementioned amendments
of the MPRDA by the MPRDAA did not apply to the case as the
amendments were promulgated subsequent to the events at issue in this
case (par 8). 
The facts, issues and decision of the Court will be discussed, followed
by a commentary about the correctness of the decision. The public law
road embarked upon by the Supreme Court of Appeal will also be
examined. A conclusion will be reached about the impact of the decision
of the Supreme Court of Appeal as the decision was aimed at ‘all other
rights under the MPRDA’ (par 24).
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2 Facts
An application for a prospecting right by Dilokong Chrome Mine (Pty)
Ltd’s (Dilokong) was accepted by the Regional Manager and granted by
the DDG on condition that Dilokong complied with the BEE imperative of
a 26 percent shareholding in terms of section 2(d) of the MPRDA (par 3).
Due to Dilokong’s inability to comply with the BEE condition, a notarial
deed for the prospecting right was not executed and registration of the
prospecting right did not take place (see par 5). Meanwhile, Mawetse (SA)
Mining Corporation (Pty) Ltd (Mawetse) also applied for a prospecting
right which application was not accepted by the Regional Manager
because Dilokong already held a prospecting right for the same mineral
and land (par 6). In an internal appeal against the grant of a prospecting
right to Dilokong, the minister upheld Dilokong’s prospecting right and
dismissed Mawetse’s appeal (par 6). 
Mawetse applied for a review of the minister’s decision in the Gauteng
Division of the High Court. Dilokong filed a counter-application to compel
the Department of Mineral Resources to execute the prospecting right
(par 6). Masipa J decided that Dilokong did not hold a valid prospecting
right which could lawfully be exercised and it no longer constituted a bar
to the consideration of Mawetse’s application for a prospecting right (parr
1 & 2). Dilokong (fifth appellant) appealed against the decision to the
Supreme Court of Appeal (par 1). The minister and officials of the
Department (the other appellants) did not participate in the appeal
although they made common cause with Dilokong and filed a
comprehensive answering affidavit to that end in the court below (par 1).
3 Issues
At issue on appeal was whether a prospecting right had lawfully been
granted to Dilokong and, if so, whether Dilokong could lawfully exercise
that right. Allied to this issue, was a further question on whether that
right had lapsed due to its expiry or abandonment (par 1).
4 Decision
The Court decided that a prospecting right was lawfully granted to
Dilokong on condition that it comply with the section 2(d) BEE
requirement of a 26 percent shareholding. Due to its failure to meet this
condition, it was held that Dilokong was not entitled to exercise the
prospecting right. The Court decided that Dilokong’s prospecting right
had expired due to effluxion of time (par 28). In arriving at its decision,
different features of a prospecting right received the attention of the
Supreme Court of Appeal, some of which will now be discussed.
4 1 Acquisition of a Prospecting Right
It was confirmed by the Court that the decision to grant a prospecting
right is made by the DDG and not the regional manager (par 24). As will
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be shown below, unlike in the Meepo decision (Meepo v Kotze supra), it
was decided that a prospecting right is granted on the date that the DDG
approves the recommendation of the regional manager to grant a
prospecting right (par 19). Acquisition of a prospecting right thus takes
place upon the date of approval.
In dispute was whether Dilokong could lawfully have been required to
be BEE-compliant (par 11). It was argued that an applicant for a
prospecting right could not be compelled to be BEE-compliant and the
mining charter does not apply to applications for prospecting rights. The
Court held that section 17(4) of the MPRDA (see par 1 above)
unequivocally empowers the minister to make the grant of a prospecting
right conditional upon compliance with the section 2(d) BEE requirement
(par 15). The request was perceived by the Court as a necessary
preliminary step to ensure compliance with the section 2(d) BEE
imperative (par 15). Compliance with the request, therefore, was not
merely optional (par 17). It should be added that the minister or delegate
first has to consider the type of mineral or extent of the proposed
prospecting project before such a request is made (s 17(4)) – which
discretionary power is vague and open-ended (see Dale ‘Comparative
International and African Mineral Law as Applied in the Formation of the
New South African Mineral Development Legislation’ in Bastida, Wälde
& Warden-Fernández (eds) International and Comparative Mineral Law
and Policy (2005) 834). 
The Court found that the DDG had lawfully requested Dilokong to
comply with the section 2(d) BEE requirements, which request was
acknowledged by Dilokong but not complied with (par 17). It can be
added that a prospecting right is linked to a mining right insofar as the
holder of a prospecting right has an exclusive right to apply for and be
granted a mining right in respect of the mineral and prospecting area (s
19(1)(b)). Because of the linkage or continuity of tenure of rights,
compliance with BEE requirements at the prospecting stage makes sense
(as to linkage, see Badenhorst ‘Security of Mineral Tenure in South Africa:
Carrot or stick?’ 2014 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 5, 14
& 20).
4 2 Nature of a Prospecting Right
The Court rejected the decision in Meepo (Meepo v Kotze supra) that: (a)
the granting of a prospecting right is contractual in nature; (b) consensus
has to be reached; or (c) an applicant has to consent to the terms and
conditions of the right (Mawetse (SCA) supra at parr 22, 23 & 26).
According to Majiedt JA, the right is granted by the minister or delegate
without the concurrence of the affected party and ‘occurs outside the
ambit of and regardless of the existence of a contract between the
minister and a successful applicant’ (par 24). Thus, the granting of a
prospecting right does not require consensus between a grantor and
grantee of a prospecting right (par 26). In conclusion, Majiedt JA stated
that ‘the decision in Meepo that the right is granted only at the stage of the
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registration of the right is wrong’ (par 28). This statement by Majiedt JA
seems incorrect as it was decided in Meepo that a prospecting right is
granted upon execution of the notarial deed and not on registration
(Meepo v Kotze supra at par 46.1).
The Court also distinguished Ondombo Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Minister
of Mineral and Energy Affairs ((1991) 4 SA 718 (A); for a discussion of the
decision, see Badenhorst & Van Heerden ‘A comparison between the
nature of prospecting leases in terms of the Precious Stones Act 73 of
1964 and prospecting permits in terms of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 –
Ondombo Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs’
1993 TSAR 159), where it was decided that a prospecting lease in terms
of section 4(1)(b) of the Precious Stones Act 73 of 1964 was a contract,
from the case in point on the basis that section 17 of the MPRDA differs
totally from section 4 of the Precious Stones Act 73 of 1964 (see Mawetse
supra at par 27). The similarities between the dispensation of state
holding of rights under the Precious Stones Act, and the current
dispensation were overlooked by the Court. It is submitted that the
following reasoning by Eksteen JA in the Ondombo Beleggings decision is
still reflective of contract law:
The fact that the [Precious Stones] Act expressly requires certain matters to be
dealt with in the lease, and in some instances gives the Minister an overriding
say in determining certain terms, does not, in my view, detract from the
contractual nature of the lease. After all, much the same circumstances
pertain to numerous commercial agreements, more particularly when an
individual contracts with a large corporation and is presented with a printed
form of agreement. The mere fact that the individual may not readily be able
to procure the alteration of any of the terms, does not detract from the fact
that his acceptance of those terms would lead to a binding contract being
concluded (Ondombo Beleggings supra at 724 F-H).
Majiedt JA reasoned in Mawetse that an administrative act is not
changed into a contract merely because the prospecting right is ‘subject
to the terms and conditions’ stipulated in section 17(6) of the MPRDA
(Mawetse supra at par 27). The contractual terminology used by the
legislature is, thus, treated as the consequence of an administrative
decision rather than a contract.
The Court decided that the granting of a prospecting right is an
authoritative unilateral administrative act by the minister or her delegate,
by virtue of their statutory powers under the MPRDA (parr 24, 26 & 27).
It was perceived as an administrative decision ‘whereby rights are
granted with or without conditions and in terms whereof rights accrue to
and obligations are imposed upon the successful applicant’ (par 26). This
was held also to apply to all other rights under the MPRDA (see par 24).
The administrative decision is thus perceived as the source of the
(statutory) prospecting right, its entitlements and duties of the holder of a
prospecting right. 
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Majiedt JA describes the nature of a unilateral administrative act with
reference to the following dictum of Schreiner JA in Mustapha v Receiver
of Revenue, Lichtenburg (1958 3 SA 343 (A) 347E-F): 
In exercising the power to grant or renew, or to refuse to grant or renew, the
permit, the Minister acts as a state official and not as a private owner, who need
listen to no representations and is entitled to act as arbitrarily as he pleases …
(Mustapha supra at par 24).
The above dictum of Schreiner JA should, in fairness, be placed in its
proper context or quoted in full. The Mustapha decision dealt with the
termination of a permit to occupy a trading site, which permit was granted
in terms of section 18(4) of the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936
during the apartheid era, to Indian traders on land owned by the South
African Native Trust and was earmarked for blacks as beneficiaries. The
termination of the permit was challenged due to the alleged cancellation
solely because the holders were Indians (Mustapha supra at par 352G-H).
Ogilvie Thompson AJA decided that if the minister (in his capacity as
trustee of the Trust) granted a permit to occupy a trading site, a contract is
concluded when the grantee expressly or impliedly accepts the permit (par
356D-H). According to Ogilvie Thompson AJA, the rights of the parties are
defined by contract and not statute (par 356H). Thus, termination of a
permit amounted to the exercise of a contractual right and not a statutory
power (par 357A). According to the Court, the only way by which the
cancellation of the permit could be challenged as bad law, was if an
implied term that the contract would not be cancelled simply because the
permit holders were Indians, could be established (see par 59A-B). In the
(obvious) absence of such a term, it was decided that the trustee was
entitled to terminate the permit without providing reasons for its
cancellation (parr 358D-E & 359F-G). Schreiner JA agreed with the
contractual construction, but, in dissent, decided that despite the
contractual nature of the permit, the powers of the minister still had to be
exercised within the framework of the statute and regulations (par 347D).
Thus, the power to fix the terms of the permit and to act in accordance
with such terms, were regarded as statutory powers (par 347E). After a
review of the legislation, Schreiner JA correctly found that the minister was
not empowered to terminate the permit on the ground that the holders
were Indians (par 350H). In order to contextualise Schreiner JA’s prima
facie unrestricted statement, it should be noted that his sentence in the
above dictum ended with a proviso, namely, ‘so long as he breaks no
contract’, which proviso was left out by the Court in the Mawetse decision.
Schreiner JA also distinguished the actions of the state from an owner of
land, who (at that time) could exclude and eject persons from his land, by
stating ‘[b]ut the minister has no such free hand. He receives his powers
directly or indirectly from the Statute alone, and can only act within its
limitations, express or implied’ (par 347F-G). In other words, a proviso of
statutory limitation must be added to the stated dictum of Schreiner JA to
provide a complete picture of his dissenting decision. 
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The Court in Mawetse subsequently mentioned that statutory licenses
are regarded as ‘public law instruments’ in English law (Mawetse supra at
par 25). The Court referred to Norweb plc v Dixon (1995 3 All ER 952 (QB))
(at par 25) where it was decided that the obligation of a public supplier of
electricity to supply electricity to a consumer on terms which are dictated
by legislation is inconsistent with a contract. By stating the position in
English law only, or in passing, it seems as if the Court hinted that a
granted prospecting right is in the nature of a statutory license or public
law instrument.
As to the nature of a registered prospecting right, which was not
necessary for the Court to decide, Majiedt JA accepted obiter ‘that the right
becomes a limited real right only upon registration’ (Mawetse supra at par
19). The Court seemed to have accepted that notarial execution of a
prospecting right was required because it is a limited real right in terms of
the then section 5(1) of the MPRDA (par 5). This was despite the Court’s
awareness of the contradiction between section 5(1) of the MPRDA and
section 2(4) of the MTRA and the Court’s view that it was not a cause for
concern in the present case (par 19). As indicated before, the legislature
was concerned enough to rectify section 5(1) of the MPRDA. The Court
correctly indicated that the purposes of registration is also to serve as a
notice to the general public, ‘akin to registration of immovable property
in the Deeds Office’ (par 19). The principle of publicity of a real right is
correctly used by the Court to explain and justify the real nature of a
registered prospecting right. It can be added that the legislature has opted
for a right that is registrable in a public office, is real in nature, and has
stated ex abundanti cautela that a registered real right is enforceable
against third parties, in order to provide security of tenure to mining
companies and allay fears of insecure rights by investors in such
companies (s 2(g); see, Badenhorst 2014 Journal of Energy and Natural
Resources Law supra at 13-14 & 17-18). Security of mineral tenure is
important for any developing country as it is one of the most important
criteria for mining companies when deciding on investment preferences
(Dale ‘Security of Tenure as a Key Issue Facing the International Mining
Company: A South African Perspective’ 1996 Journal of Energy and
Resources Law 298; Bastida ‘A Review of the Concept of Security of
Mineral Tenure: Issues and Challenges’ 2001 Journal of Energy and
Resources Law 31 & 32). The way in which Schreiner JA was quoted in the
Mawetse decision will surely not enhance faith in security of mineral
tenure in South Africa. 
4 3 Content of the Prospecting Right
The Court found that the prospecting right was granted on condition that
Dilokong comply with the request to be BEE-compliant (Mawetse supra at
par 17). A prospecting right is subject to the MPRDA, applicable law and
the terms and conditions stipulated in the right (s 17(6)). The Court
regarded compliance with section 2(d) of the MPRDA as a condition of
grant that was unequivocally imposed when the DDG approved the
recommendation about granting a prospecting right (par 17). The Court
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decided that, upon non-compliance with the condition, Dilokong was not
entitled to exercise the prospecting right and the Department of Minerals
was entitled to refuse notarial execution of the prospecting right (par 17).
4 4 Duration of a Prospecting Right
To determine the starting point of the period of a prospecting right, the
Court distinguished between three distinct legal processes, namely: (a)
the granting of the prospecting right; (b) the execution of the prospecting
right; and (c) the coming into effect of the right (par 19).
According to the Court, the above legal processes take place at the
following moments:
(a) A prospecting right is granted on the date that the DDG approves the
recommendation of the regional manager (to grant a prospecting right;
par 19). From the date of the grant of a prospecting right, an applicant
becomes the holder of a valid prospecting right as defined in the MPRDA
(par 19). 
(b) Upon execution of a notarial deed, a prospecting right (in the nature of a
contract) is not granted (see parr 19 & 22-24).
(c) A prospecting right comes into effect in terms of section 17(5) of the
MPRDA on approval of the lodged environmental plan (par 19; it should
be remembered that this subsection has subsequently been amended by
the MPRDAA). The Court held that the decision to grant a prospecting
right remains valid until set aside by a Court (par 20). According to the
Court, Dilokong should have obtained a mandamus compelling the
department to execute the right, if the prospecting right was lawfully
granted (par 20).
It was, however, decided that the period for which the right endures
has to be computed from the time that the applicant is informed of the
grant (parr 19, 21 & 28). For purposes of such calculation, it was held to
be irrelevant that the prospecting right still had to be executed and had
not yet become effective (par 21). The Court reasoned that the aim of
communication of the decision was to enable the grantee to challenge
objectionable conditions and alert other competitors (par 19). 
Lapsing of a prospecting right, amongst other reasons, takes place
upon effluxion of the time period for which the right has been granted (s
56(a) of the MPRDA) or abandonment of the prospecting right (s 56(f) of
the MPRDA; par 18).
The Court found that:
(a) Dilokong’s prospecting right was granted on 21 June 2007 when the DDG
approved the regional manager’s recommendation to grant a prospecting
right (par 19).
(b) The period for which the prospecting right endured had to be computed
from 18 July 2007 when Dilokong was informed of the grant (parr 19 &
21). According to the Court, upon this date ‘Dilokong became the holder of
a valid prospecting right, subject to compliance with the request to prove
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BEE compliance’ (par 21). This statement of the Court is in conflict with
the Court’s decision that vesting of the prospecting right takes place
(earlier) upon the grant. A right, whether private or public in nature,
cannot vest at different moments in time and this statement of the Court
about vesting upon notification seems incorrect. The same mistake was
made by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Mineral Resources of
the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore (2013 (4) SA 461 (SCA) parr 54 & 56; see also
Badenhorst & Olivier ‘Conversion of Jointly-held old order mining rights’
2014 THRHR 145 & 152).
(c) Dilokong’s (four year) prospecting right had expired due to the effluxion
of time on 17 July 2011 (par 21).
It was not necessary for the Court to find that Dilokong had abandoned
its right due to its failure to take steps to enforce its rights (par 21).
5 Comment
The Court’s identification of an administrative decision taking place
when the DDG accepts the recommendation of the regional manager, is
correct. The Court’s description of the administrative act, with reference
to the dictum of Schreiner JA in the Mustapha decision without provisos
of statutory limitation, is unfortunate for the current constitutional
dispensation and the custodial administration by the State of the mineral
resources of the people of South Africa (s 3 of the MPRDA). Schreiner JA’s
decision in Mustapha does not support such an unbridled state of affairs.
Although the dissenting opinion of Schreiner JA in Mustapha was just
and correct and the majority of the Court (ironically), in a sense, ‘used’
the principles of contract to arrive at its decision, it should be noted that
the decision in Mustapha, regarding the nature of a permit, is contrary to
the decision in Mawetse regarding the nature of a prospecting right.
Although Majiedt JA did not rely on the Mustapha case for his decision
that a prospecting right is an administrative act, it is a pity that the Court
did not deal with the Mustapha decision given the similarities between a
permit to occupy land for trading, and a right to enter and prospect on
the land (in terms of s 5(3) of the MPRDA). Just like the Meepo decision,
the conclusion of a contract was recognised by the Appellate Division in
Mustapha. 
As suggested by the Court, the granting of (all) rights under the MPRDA
by an official would be a unilateral administrative act. However,
differences do exist between these rights. Prospecting rights are granted
by the DDG upon acceptance of the recommendation by the regional
manager, whilst mining rights are granted by the minister. These rights
are registrable in the MPTRO (s 5(1)(d) of the MTRA). Reconnaissance
permits and mining permits are issued by the regional manager or Chief
Director; items 3 & 11 of the ministerial delegation) and are only
recordable in the MPTRO (s 5(1)(v) of the MTRA). Different officials and
different processes are, therefore, involved in the granting and issuing of
rights and permits and the registration or recording thereof. Registered
rights are real in nature, whilst recorded rights are not real in nature (see
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Badenhorst & Mostert (2004) supra at 13-28 to 13-29). Thus,
generalisations about the grant and the nature of rights or permits
granted or issued in terms of the MPRDA cannot be made, unless the
Court did not refer to permits as well. Further references to prospecting
rights also apply to mining rights (but not to permits or permissions).
Whether a statutory prospecting right can be regarded as a statutory
licence or public law instrument, as in English law, is another matter. A
licence in English real property law is merely a permission to be on land,
and can take different forms. First, a bare licence is a gratuitous
permission to enter land which can be revoked at any time because of
the lack of valuable consideration (see Harpum, Bridge & Dixon (eds)
Megarry and Wade the Law of Real Property (2012) 1439). Second, a
contractual licence is granted under the terms of a contract and subject
to the rules of contract (Harpum, Bridge & Dixon (eds) supra at 1439).
Third, a licence may be linked to a property interest (for instance, a
permission to enter land is attached as an adjunct to a profit à prendre or
an easement, which are proprietary rights; see Harpum, Bridge & Dixon
(eds) supra at 1440). The first and third type of licence do not make sense
in South African law due to the absence of valuable consideration as a
requirement for the formation of a contract (Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD
279) and the establishment of a limited real right upon creation of
servitude which is not linked to a separate permission to enter land. A
contractual licence was absent in the Mawetse decision. The nature and
features of a statutory licence or public law instrument in English law
and/or its equivalents in South African law, are not investigated or
discussed either. Incorporation of English law by mere reference to
examples in such a system, without investigating its suitability to South
African law, creates legal uncertainty. 
Prospecting rights or mining rights need not necessarily be treated as
public law instruments. For instance, the nature of statutory prospecting
or mining rights within Australian mineral legislation (with similar
structures to the MPRDA) is still being examined within the paradigm of
personal rights and proprietary rights (see, for instance, the examination
of the legal nature of prospecting or mining licences by Hunt (Mining Law
in Western Australia (2009) 96 & 154-155) with reference to, and by
comparison with, a bare licence, a leasehold interest or a profit à prendre
at common law (see also Badenhorst ‘Towards a Theory on publically-
owned minerals in Victoria’ 2014 Australian Property Law Journal 157). 
It seems that because of the transformative nature of the MPRDA, the
courts try to move away from tried and tested common law concepts. For
instance, in Minister of Mineral Resources v Sishen Iron Ore Company (Pty)
Ltd (2014 2 SA 603 (CC) par 68) the Constitutional Court accepted, without
investigation, that the common law supports the erroneous view that upon
conversion by one of the holders of jointly held ‘old order rights’, the
converter acquires the entire shareholding. An investigation of the
common law principles of co-ownership or joint holding of real rights (see
Badenhorst & Olivier ‘Conversion of “old order mining rights”: Sleeping at
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the MPRDA’s wheel of (mis)fortune? – Sishen Iron Ore Company (Pty) Ltd v
Minister of Mineral Resources (unreported decision) case no 28980/10
(NGD)’ 2013 THRHR 269, 275-277 & 281) would have indicated that the
common law was actually in line with and supported the Constitutional
Court’s correct decision that, upon conversion and registration, the
converter only acquires a new mining right in accordance with its former
shareholding (parr 67, 71 & 77). 
Section 15(2) of the MTRA requires the execution of a notarial
‘contract’ which seems to suggest that the legislature somehow had a
contract in mind. It is conceded that the MTRA originally dealt with the
registration of agreements in terms of the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967
and the Precious Stones Act (supra), whilst the new MPRDA system was
forced onto the provisions of the MTRA without proper analysis or
thought. Even if notarial execution of a contract is just required for
registration purposes, it cannot be without legal consequences. Such a
‘contract’ has, as its content, contractual rights which the Court seemed
to ignore at all costs. 
Upon registration of the notarial ‘contract’ a limited real right is created.
In terms of basic property law principles, three juristic acts are involved
upon the creation or transfer of a real right, namely: (a) the conclusion of
a contract or obligation-creating agreement; (b) the existence of a real
agreement to transfer and receive the real right; and (c) the registration of
the right in the Deeds Office (Van der Merwe ‘Things’ in Joubert (ed) The
Law of South Africa (2014) par 20). If by analogy, these basic principles are
applied to registration of a prospecting right in the MPTRO, it becomes
apparent that an obligation-creating agreement and a real agreement are
absent from the Supreme Court of Appeal’s construction. On the one
hand, the Supreme Court of Appeal recognises the legislature’s creation of
a (common law style) limited real right and the policy of notice of
registered rights and security of tenure, whilst, on the other hand, it denies
the creation of a preceding obligation-creating agreement and real
agreement by consensus. Thus, a grantee acquires a public law licence
prior to registration and a private law style real right upon registration
which is not doctrinally sound, even though it is based on the
interpretation of provisions of two sister statutes. The unilateral
administrative right precedes the possible conclusion of a contract (with
the same or even different terms) at a later stage. The Court
acknowledged that the grantee may still challenge and object to some of
the conditions after granting a prospecting right (Mawetse supra at par
19), which seems odd as the prospecting right has already been granted
in a unilateral manner. In practice, negotiations as to the terms and
conditions to be embodied in the prospecting right or mining right do take
place (Dale in Bastida, Wälde & Warden-Fernández (eds) supra at 828). It
is submitted that upon notarial execution of the deed, a contract is created
between the parties. A unilateral administrative decision is followed by the
conclusion of a ‘prospecting contract’ and the acquisition of a real right
upon registration. The failure to recognise the different juristic acts that are
taking place can be attributed to the fact that the MPRDA does not
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distinguish between the prospecting right as an agreement, and the
prospecting right as a contractual right or real right. If the basic principles
of contract law and property law had been taken into account by the
Supreme Court of Appeal, the presence or absence of different juristic acts
could at least have been considered. If a limited real right can be regarded
as a trusted friend for purposes of security of tenure and an object of real
security, why should the preceding contract be ignored?
The Court does not convincingly explain why the duration of a
prospecting right does not have to be computed from the time that a
prospecting right is (administratively) granted. Computation from
notification of the grant does not fit the mould of a unilateral decision
taken by an official free from notions such as consensus. Or, is the
custodian’s common courtesy merely the starting point for calculations,
and how is it to be determined if the custodian, at times, is not so
courteous? 
The creation of rights by virtue of administrative acts can be
conditional. If the granting of a prospecting right is subject to a suspensive
condition, the vesting of the prospecting right must have been suspended
until the BEE requirements were met. If the grant is subject to a resolutive
condition, the grant of the prospecting right would have been terminated
upon non-compliance with the BEE requirements at the date which was
proposed for notarial execution. If so, the examination of the duration of
the prospecting right and its termination by effluxion of time was
unnecessary as the prospecting right no longer existed. The Court
accepted the view of the court-a-quo that Dilokong’s failure to meet the
BEE condition had the effect of barring Dilokong from implementing its
right to prospect (Mawetse supra at par 17) which says nothing about the
vesting or termination of the right.
Upon approval of the regional manager’s recommendation, the DDG
performed a unilateral administrative act. In the absence of notarial
execution of the agreement, the Court could have confirmed that a
contract was not concluded. It is arguable that notarial execution is not
required for the validity of the contract (as was the case with mineral
leases in terms of section 3(1) of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of
1956) but only for the purposes of registration. Notarial execution of a
contract cannot be without legal consequences.
6 Conclusion
The law in accordance with the Mawetse decision now states that upon
approval by the DDG of the recommendation of the regional manager (to
grant a prospecting right), a prospecting right is granted in terms of the
provisions of the MPRDA whilst, upon registration in the MPTRO, a
prospecting right (which is real in nature) is created. In short, the accrual
of a magical public law creature is followed by the creation of a common
law style real right. The recognition of a unilateral administrative act on
the part of the DDG, when the recommendations of the regional manager
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are accepted, should be distinguished from what takes place legally after
such a decision until registration of the prospecting right in the MPTRO.
During this interim period, the conclusion of a contract, with personal
rights as its content, is still legally possible. Objections by the grantee,
after the grant has been recognised by the Supreme Court of Appeal, and
negotiations after the grant still take place in practice, until such time that
a notarial contract is finalised. As decided in the Meepo decision, and
rejected as incorrect by the Supreme Court of Appeal, conclusion of the
contract takes place upon its notarial execution. The notarial execution
of a contract cannot be stripped of possible legal consequences or simply
be ignored, otherwise, notarial execution is simply a formalistic
requirement for the purposes of registration, which the Supreme Court of
Appeal should have clearly stated. A unilateral administrative decision
can be followed by the conclusion of a contract and, eventually, be
followed by the creation of a limited real right upon registration. Private
law doctrine need not always be discarded by the winds of change.
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